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FALL, 1965

NUMBER 4

GIDEON'S ARMY: STUDENT SOLDIERS
HENRY P. MONAGHAN*

Ours is a nation that takes great pride in the manner in which it
administers justice to its citizens. To us, "equal justice under law" is
not simply hollow rhetoric; it gives expression to some of our most
fundamental values, and it proclaims that every man should be treated
fairly and equally in the administration of the laws. It is, of course, of no
small moment that we hold such an ideal, for a nation invites judgment on
how well its performance comports with its professions of faith.1
In the administration of our laws there is much to which we can
justifiably point with pride, but it is a commonplace that there remains
a long road to travel before ideal and reality meet. In particular, we
recognize that a poor man's lack of resources all too often determines the
quality of justice he receives. At the turn of the century Mr. Martin
Dooley, the great bartender-social critic, observed, "Don't I think a poor
man has a chanst in coort? Iv coorse he has. He has the same chanst there
that he has outside. He has a splendid, poor man's chanst." 2 While observations of this character are applicable to both civil and criminal
cases, they stir especially deep feelings in the latter context, for we profess particular concern that a man not be branded a criminal and deprived of his freedom because of an empty pocketbook.$
Had Mr. Dooley been at his post on March 18, 1963, I suspect that
even he would have heartened. On that day Gideon's trumpet blew, and
a bright new banner was unfurled; it proclaimed that in every serious
criminal case the government must provide an accused with counsel if he
is too poor to hire one. 4 Thus was a significant step taken to narrow the
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; LL.B., Yale, 1958; LL.M.,

Harvard, 1960.
1 But since ideals are never perfectly attainable, "we must not exaggerate the
significance of deviations from the perfect norm." Finsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v.
Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 392, 171 N.E. 579, 582 (1930) (Cardozo, J.).
2 Bender, Mr. Dooley on the Choice of Law xxii-xxiii (1963).
8 "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on

the amount of money he has." Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 710 (1961) Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
4 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The leading commentary on the case
is, of course, Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet (1964) ; see also Kamisar, Book Review of
Gideon's Trumpet, 78 Hary. L Rev. 478 (1964), which points out that Gideon's
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gap between ideal and reality, because, as an eminent judge has noted:
"Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to . . . counsel is
by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other
rights he may have." 5 The logistical problems occasioned by the new
principle are, however, substantial. Gideon's little regiment had no real
difficulty in running up its colors, 6 but it is quite apparent that an army
-a very large one-must be raised if the victory is to be a lasting one.
My question is simply whether student soldiers may be part of that army.
I
A brief sketch of the relevant constitutional doctrine is appropriate.
The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . .
7
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Originally this provision was understood as merely recognizing that,
unlike the English practice, a criminal defendant had a right to appear
with counsel, but not as obligating the government to provide him with
one. 8 However, in 1938 the Court, in Johnson v. Zerbst,9 held that this
amendment imposed an obligation upon the federal government to provide counsel for indigents. "The Sixth Amendment," said Mr. Justice
Black, "withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the
power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless
he has or waives the assistance of counsel."'' 0
While Johnson represented a major innovation, it was not without
significant precedent. Several years before Johnson, the Court had occasion to consider the relationship of the absence of counsel to the "due
process" which, under the fourteenth amendment, each state must accord
companion, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), may well prove to be of

more lasting significance than Gideon itself. For commentary on who qualifies
as an indigent under Gideon, see Hall & Kamisar, Modern Criminal Procedure:
Cases, Comments and Questions 88-89 (1965).

5 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1956). Indeed, "even in the most routine-appearing proceedings the assistance of
able counsel may be of inestimable value." Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525,
532-33 (1964).
6 Kamisar, supra note 4, at 480-82 points out that Gideon merely toppled a
"1shaky bridge."
7 US. Const. amend. VI.
s E.g., Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 27-33 (1955); Grant,
Felix Frankfurter: A Dissenting Opinion, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1013, 1030 (1964).
"[U]ntil the decision ... in Johnson v. Zerbst ... there was little in the decisions

of any courts to indicate that the practice in the federal courts, except in capital
cases, required the appointment of counsel to assist the accused in his defense, as
contrasted with the recognized right of the accused to be represented by counsel of
his own if he so desired." Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660-61 (1948).
9 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

10 Id. at 463. It should be noted, however, that prior to this decision the general
practice in the federal courts had been to appoint counsel for indigents.
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to "all persons."11 In Powell v. Alabama,12 the famous Scottsboro case,
seven poor, illiterate Negroes who allegedly raped two white girl hoboes
appealed to the high court from convictions carrying a death sentence. On
appeal, they argued in part that their convictions resulted from a denial
of the assistance of counsel and a denial of due process. The convictions
were set aside, the Court holding that the absence of counsel violated due
process. The Court stressed in its opinion that an accused "requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him" in
order to insure the reliability of the guilt-determining process.138
Powell's sweeping language was easily capable of supporting a requirement of counsel for indigents in all serious state criminal proceedings, or,
to put the matter differently, of fastening upon the states the same re14
quirements which Johnson later imposed on the national government.
Such was not to be the case, however, for in Betts v. Brady15 a sharply
divided Court refused to push Powell to its furthest point. The false
considerations of federalism which moved the Court to refuse to so extend Powell have been examined many times, but they need not detain
us here.16 Suffice it for our purposes to note that the Court declared that
the sixth amendment is a restriction on the national government alone
and is not, "as such," applicable to the states by virtue of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment ;17 and, said the Court, due process
requires the appointment of counsel only if it appears that the defendant
is at a serious disadvantage by reason of the lack of counsel, which was
to be "tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case."18 Of
course, implicit in this holding is an assumption that in most situations it
does not make much difference whether an accused has counsel or not.' 9
11 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
12 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See generally Beaney, op. cit. supra note 8, at 151-574
18 Id. at 69.
14 This is particularly true when Powell's language was read with similar language in Johnson, which remarked on the "obvious truth that the average defendant
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented
by experienced and learned counsel." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).

25 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

16 See, e.g., Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of
Criminal Justice, 8 De Paul L. Rev. 213, 230-31 (1959). Brief for Petitioner, pp.
28-42, Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, pp. 29-37,
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) demonstrate that Betts v. Brady, supra
note 15, had the inevitable effect of increasing, not decreasing, tensions in the
federal system.
17 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942). But see Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
18 Betts v. Brady, supra note 17, at 462.
19 Id. at 472. This assumption was roundly criticized by commentators long before
it was formally abandoned in Gideon. 372 U.S. at 342-45. Indeed, in Betts itself
there are substantial grounds for believing that the lack of counsel resulted in
prejudice to the defendant. Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Dialogue on the Most Pervasive Right of an Accused, 30 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1, 42-56 (1962). Part of this assumption was obviously grounded on a
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In any event, Betts v. Brady gave birth to the "special circumstances"
rule; that is, counsel need not be appointed unless there are "special
circumstances showing that without a lawyer a defendant could not have
''20
an adequate and a fair defense.
No sooner was Betts v. Brady decided than it came under an unremitting barrage of criticism. It was not difficult to challenge its basic
rationale that an accused needs counsel only in "special circumstances,"
and it became a favorite academic pastime to discover new areas of
inconsistency between it and other established doctrine. 21 More importantly, its foundations were soon eroded by the Supreme Court itself.
As the commentators were quick to note, decisions which were fundamentally inconsistent with its rationale were handed down ;22 and, most
significantly, its "special circumstances" rule was sapped of all life. 23
Gideon in fact did little more than inter the dead. 24 But the formal
ceremony was important because, as Mr. Justice Harlan observed, the
fact that Betts v. Brady had quietly died "appears not to have been fully
'25
recognized by many state courts.
Betts v. Brady rested, in part, on the premise that the due process
clause did not fasten the sixth amendment "as such" upon the states. This
was but one way station in the yet unsettled battle over the precise
relationship between the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
and the Bill of Rights. 26 But in Pointer v. Texas,27 a case involving the
applicability to the states of another portion of the sixth amendment, a
substantial majority of the Court seems to have finally agreed upon a
single underlying theory, that the due process clause at least "incorpobelief that in "routine" criminal cases the trial judge will adequately protect the

defendant's rights. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472-73 (1942). But compare
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932). Powerful arguments were advanced
against this position in Brief for Petitioner, pp. 20-22, Brief for American Civil
Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, pp. 23-24, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
20 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 135 (1951). Later decisions made it clear that
in capital cases there was an absolute requirement that counsel be appointed. See,
e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640,
676 (1948).

21 See, e.g., Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel
and Due Process Values, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 219 (1962).
22
. Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) ; Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954). See Brief
for Petitioner,pp. 22-28, Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus
Curiae, pp. 24-, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
28 See Gideon v. Wainright, supra note 22, at 350-51 (Harlan, J., concurring).
24 Kamisar, supra note 4, at 480-82.
25 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963). For a list of the state court
decisions applying-and misapplying-the special circumstances rule, see Brief for
American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, Appendix 11, Gideon v. Wainright, supra.
26 See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 Yale L.J. 74 (1963).
27

380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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rates" the major provisions of the Bill of Rights and fastens them las
such" upon the states.2 8 For our purposes this means that the measure
of the state's obligation to provide counsel is the same as that of the
national government, 29 which, as will be seen below, requires that counsel be appointed in all cases except those involving "petty offenses."
It labors the obvious to do more than point out that the obligation of a
state to provide counsel poses an enormous administrative problem. 80
Counsel must be found. Our question is the extent to which law school
students may provide "Assistance of Counsel." Several states now have
provisions permitting students to so act.81 In particular, however, the
28 Id. at 406. I take Pointer as embodying the triumph of the doctrine of
"selective incorporation." There remains the question whether the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment imposes restrictions on the states in addition to those
contained in the Bill of Rights. See the concurring and dissenting opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29 That is to say, a "watered down version" of the amendment will not be the
measure of the states' obligation. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1964) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
80 In this respect, it should be noted that there are areas of state law which pose
problems which, for their federal counterparts, are less pressing. This is, outside of
the District of Columbia, particularly true of the right to counsel in proceedings
involving juveniles, sexual psychopaths, defective delinquents and other "civil" proceedings which may result in some form of "commitment." I am not here suggesting
that all these proceedings present the same problems, from the right to counsel or
any other point of view. But the problems they do present have been generally
brushed aside with the verbalism that they are "civil' not "criminal" proceedings
(the sixth amendment, it will be recalled, applies only to "criminal prosecutions"),
and accordingly, the safeguards of the "criminal" process are inapplicable. E.g.,
Commonwealth v. McGruder, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sheets 495, 205 N.E.2d 726 (1965).
For a vigorous criticism of this practice see Allen, The Borderland of Criminal
Justice 14-24; Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceedings, 57
Nw. U.L. Rev. 383 (1962). In response, one might say that any proceeding which
results in an indefinite loss of liberty has enough of the penal in it to be considered
a "criminal" proceeding for constitutional purposes. Allen, op. cit supra. See
Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New
Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 290 (1965) (hereinafter
cited as "Punitive Legislation"). Compare materials at notes 50 & 51, infra. Or, one
might despair of any attempt to draw meaningful distinctions between "criminal"
and "civil" proceedings, noting that while the constitution conditions many of its
guarantees on the existence of criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has never
satisfactorily come to grips with the meaning of "crime." Hart, The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 Law and Contemp. Prob. 401, 431 (1958). See United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) ; One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693 (1965). Compare Comment, "Punitive Legislation," supra. But in any event it
seems to me that even if all or some of these proceedings are "civil" in nature, many
of the same policies which call for the assistance of counsel in "criminal" proceedings are applicable whenever a man's liberty is at stake. Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also Juelich v. United States, 342
F.2d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1965). I recognize, of course, that it is often urged, especially
in juvenile proceedings, that the presence of counsel might go far to destroy the
beneficial aims of "civil" proceedings, and I do not believe that this view can be
dismissed out of hand. Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert.
granted 381 U.S. 902 (1965), may throw some light on the measure of the constitutional guarantees to be accorded juvenile offenders.
81 The New York Times reports that at least a half dozen states now have some
provision for student representation of indigents. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1965, p.
1, col. 7. See also Silverstein, The Continuing Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright
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R oxbury District Court in Massachusetts, in co-operation with Boston
University School of Law, has an extensive pilot project now in operation, and it is appropriate to examine that program.
II
Massachusetts has a dual system of trial courts.8 2 The superior court
is the court of general trial jurisdiction, but there are also district courts.
The district courts sit without jury and possess limited jurisdiction. On
the civil side, for example, they have no equity jurisdiction; on the
criminal side their jurisdiction is confined to the trial of misdemeanors
and "lesser" felonies and to holding "probable cause and binding over"
hearings on other felonies.88 On conviction in the district court a defendant may appeal for a trial de novo in the superior court.34 The theory of
the district courts is, of course, that they will dispose of the multitude
of minor matters over which there is relatively little dispute, thereby preventing the superior court from becoming clogged.
In response to Gideon,"5 the Supreme Judicial Court amended its
general rule 10 to provide counsel for any "defendant charged with a
crime for which a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed."8' 6 More
to the point here, the court also gave its imprimatur to a plan by which
qualified law students could "appear on behalf of an indigent defendant
in any district court." Rule 11 provides:
A senior student in a law school in the Commonwealth, with the
written approval of the dean of the said school of his character, legal
ability, and special training, may appear without compensation on
behalf of an indigent defendant in any District Court, provided that
the conduct of the case is under the general supervision of a member
of the bar of the Commonwealth assigned by a court or employed by
a recognized legal aid society or defender committee to represent an
indigent defendant in a criminal case as a matter of charity. Such
written approval, for a student or group of students, shall be filed
with the clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of
Suffolk and shall be in effect for a period of twelve months from the
date of filing unless withdrawn earlier. The expression "general
supervision" in this rule shall not be construed to require the personal attendance in court of the supervising member of the bar. 7
on the States, 51 A.B.A.J. 1023, 1024 (1965).
82 See generally Mottla, Massachusetts Practice, Civil Practice (3d ed. 1962);
Massachusetts State Government: A Citizen's Handbook 297 (1956).
88 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 218, §§ 26-37 (1958).
84 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 278 § 18 (1959).
85 And to its own decision in Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 347 Mass. 387, 198
N.E.2d 403 (1964).
86 Prior to the amendment, rule 10 restricted the assignment of counsel to noncapital felony cases. Crane, Court Rules Annotated 117 (1961).
87 Mass. Sup. Ct. R. 11 was amended by order dated April 27, 1965 and reads as
set out in the text.
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The major utilization of rule 11 has been in the Roxbury district of
Boston. Roxbury is a large community, with a population estimated at
85,000. At the turn of the century it was a fashionable middle-class
district; but it is now predominantly a lower income, heavily Negro
community, where more than forty percent of the adult population have
not gone beyond elementary school, and where one-third of the children
have only one parent living at home. "It is an area where domestic relations, debts, landlord-tenant and criminal cases are numerous, and where
low income and lack of education leave the average resident at a disadvantage in coping with the law. There are over 30,000 criminal complaints filed in the Roxbury District Court each year. Presiding Justice
Elwood S. McKenney estimates that in excess of seventy percent of these
defendants are not represented by legal counsel."'8 This, then, is an
appropriate laboratory for putting to the test our commitment to the
Gideon principle, because here is the criminal law in its characteristic
posture in the twentieth century-"justice" administered on a mass basis.
With the assistance of foundation grants, the Gideon principle is being
implemented in the following manner: Two attorneys from the staff of a
public defender organization have been assigned to represent indigent
defendants in probable cause hearings, felonies over which the district
court takes jurisdiction and certain "serious" misdemeanors. Thirty
specially selected law students at Boston University, working in teams of
two, pick up the remainder of the cases, including proceedings in juvenile
courts, a function which the Massachusetts district courts perform. The
distinction between serious and non-serious misdemeanors is apparently
made on a non-rigid basis, for there are many instances where the
students have represented indigents who have been exposed to jail sentences of a year or more.
The role which student counsel play in the program is, however, a
carefully delimited one. A specially selected member of the law school
faculty, Mr. James Bailey, has been assigned full time to supervise the
actual operation of the program. When the district judge decides that a
case is properly assignable to "the Roxbury defenders," he formally assigns it to Mr. Bailey. Once Mr. Bailey receives the case he in turn
assigns it to one of the fifteen two-man teams and thoroughly discusses
it with these students in terms of the legal, evidentiary and tactical problems it presents. The students then conduct whatever research is necessary, secure and interview witnesses and draft whatever motions and
special pleas are appropriate. The case is generally called for trial one
week after it has been assigned, and motions and special pleas are heard
88 Spangenberg, The Boston University Roxbury Defender Project, 17 J. Legal
Ed. 311, 313 (1965). This article contains a detailed description of the Roxbury

Defender Project.
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before trial; continuances are, of course, granted for cause. At the trial,
one of the two students conducts the proceeding, from the presenting of
motions through argument on disposition. Mr. Bailey is, however, personally present at each trial; he sits at the counsel table and is permitted
by the court to examine any witness if he deems it advisable to do so.
In addition to the close supervision they receive in the courtroom, the
Roxbury defenders receive special course instruction. They receive a
series of preliminary lectures on Massachusetts criminal procedure, including lectures from the district judge, Mr. Bailey and various court
officers. In addition, various members of the Massachusetts bar conduct
seminar-type discussions concerned with criminal procedure. Finally,
each student is required to take a special advanced course in criminal
procedure. This course is primarily concerned with the recent "federalization" of state criminal procedure, and accordingly, its major emphasis
is on the reach of the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments.
III
The question is, of course, whether the Roxbury project is consistent
with the Gideon mandate. If it is, it and programs like it may make a
significant contribution to the administrative problems created by Gideon.
At the outset, it is desirable to consider in some detail the potential
scope of Gideon. While Gideon was a felony case, -it is difficult to believe
that the "felony-misdemeanor" distinction has much relevance to its
reach.5 5a Rather, it seems to me that, correctly interpreted, Gideon imposes an obligation on the states to provide counsel in all "serious"
criminal cases. 89 But, conversely, if an offense can be fairly characterized
as a "petty" crime, there is no obligation to afford counsel. Accordingly,
in those situations where the Roxbury defenders are involved in "petty"
offenses, the state affords the indigent assistance beyond what the con40
stitution compels.
88a Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888)

; Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d

263 (5th Cir. 1965). But see Kamisar, supra note 21, at 260-66. Professor Kamisar
argues in substance that if a state denominates a crime a "felony" ex hypothesi, it is
an offense serious enough to warrant the assistance of counsel.

89 The lower federal courts have been reluctant to extend the constitutional right
of counsel to habeas corpus and other collateral relief, often characterizing them as
"civil" proceedings. But see Foster v. United States, 345 F.2d 675, 676 (6th Cir.
1965). Whatever the merits of a refusal to extend the right of counsel, it is difficult
to believe that the result should be determined by a label of this sort. The due
process clause should not be overlooked. Eskridge v. Rhay, 345 F.2d 778, 782 (9th
Cir. 1965). In any event, whether constitutionally required or not, assistance of
counsel in these situations might be afforded through legislation. This would open
still another area for student representation.
40 This is subject to one qualification. It is possible to conceive of a situation
where the student counsel is so ineffective that a court could conclude that due
process was violated because the "assistance" rendered by the student left the
accused far worse off than if he were thrown upon his own resources.
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The Petty Crime Concept
Nearly forty years ago Felix Frankfurter and Thomas Corcoran observed that there had been "progressively imposed upon the federal
[district] courts an intolerable amount of trivial business," involving
them in a great many minor criminal matters.41 Their concern was
whether the constitution demanded that defendants be accorded trial by
jury in minor criminal cases, but their inquiry is relevant here as well.
Article III of the constitution gives an accused a right to a jury in the
"trial of all crimes," and the sixth amendment reiterates the same right
"in all criminal prosecutions." The difference in language does not seem
to be significant, 42 and the authors argued vigorously that both clauses
were drafted against a long and well established practice of excluding the
right to jury trial from "minor" or "petty" offenses. While the Court has
never had occasion to interpret the sixth amendment's "in all criminal
proceedings" in the context of its guarantee of assistance of counsel, the
Court has accepted the view that this same language does not require a
jury trial where the accused is charged with petty crimes.43
One might question whether the sixth amendment's introductory language "in all criminal prosecutions" need or should have the same content
for all the guarantees it qualifies. That this should be the case is, of course,
textually satisfying; and it seems highly likely that those proverbial sages,
the founding fathers, assumed that the amendment's introductory phrase
embodied a unitary conception of a "criminal prosecution," however
imprecise its limits. Yet the point is not free from difficulty, for the
policies that demand a jury trial are not at all identical with those which
call for the appointment of counsel, which, unlike the jury, is essential to
insure the accuracy of the guilt-determining process. To put the matter
somewhat differently, if the introductory clause, "in all criminal prosecutions," be given a single content for all that follows in the sixth amendment so that, like the right to a jury trial, the provision for "Assistance
of Counsel" is inapplicable to petty crimes, the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments may, in many situations, require the
41

Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional

Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 976 (1926). This article is
criticized in Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 245 (1959).

See also Comment, The Availability of Criminal Jury Trials Under the Sixth

Amendment 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 311 (1965).
42 Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra note 41, at 968-75, 978-79. Corwin, The
Constitution of the United States of America 638 (1952). This is, of course, subject
to the limitation that article III is a limitation only on the federal courts, where the
sixth amendment now applies "as such" as a restriction on the states. See notes 26-29
supra.
4s District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); see also United States
v. Barnette, 376 U.S. 681, 740 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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"Assistance of Counsel" in order to insure the accuracy of the guilt4
determining-or liberty depriving-process.
To the extent that the sixth amendment's "Assistance of Counsel" and
the fifth and the fourteenth amendments' due process clauses are looked
upon as insuring the reliability of the guilt-determining process, it is
analytically difficult to maintain any distinction based upon degrees of
crimes. But, nonetheless, I think that the essential idea embodied in the
petty offense concept is sound and, accordingly, that there are a great
many offenses for which counsel need not be provided, given their
"minor" nature and the high social cost in attempting to provide counsel.4 5 Due process, assistance of counsel, etc., are, after all, more than
just disembodied ideals alone concerned with insuring the reliability of
the guilt-determining process; they do not demand the impossible. "Due
process," notes Judge Schaefer, "at any given time includes those procedures that are fair and feasible in the light of then existing values and
capabilities.""4 A perfect system would provide counsel for every offense;
indeed, it would go much further and provide the defendant with every
resource necessary to permit him to make his defense. 47 But few believe
44

Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1965). See Gaskins v. Kennedy,
350 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1965) (due process did not require the appointment of counsel in a parole revocation hearing where facts not disputed). Juelich involves a
somewhat amusing aspect of the right to counsel cases. Cases like Gideon justify
imposing a constitutional right to counsel because legal proceedings are too
complicated for the untutored. "In Gideon v. Wainright . . . we recognized a
fundamental fact that a layman, no matter how intelligent, could not possibly
forward his claims of innocence, and violation of previously declared rights adequately." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 n.20 (1965). But it is also firmly
settled that the right to counsel embraces the right to proceed without counsel
(Juelich v. United States, supra at 31), despite the fact that the accused is ex
hypothesi in desperate need of such assistance. This apparent anomaly results from
the fact that the constitutional provisions are multi-valued, not single-valued systems; and our respect for the dignity of the individual compels us to permit an accused "to go it alone" if he so chooses. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 Yale L.J. 319, 347 (1957). However, in Juelich, the Fifth Circuit indicated its acceptance of the rule that, while a
defendant entitled to counsel under the sixth amendment has an absolute right to
waive that assistance, a person entitled to counsel under the due process clause has
no such absolute right. The distinction between the two situations does not seem
sound to me, and I suspect that it is really bottomed upon a dissatisfaction with the
waiver rule of the sixth amendment cases.
45 Kamisar, supra note 21, at 267-72. But Professor Kamisar would void any
conviction for a petty offense if the absence of counsel resulted in a specific showing
of prejudice. "Q. So, we come back to the Betts rule after all? A. Yes, when the
charge is dumping ashes in the harbor of New York 'not robbery or burglary."' Id.
at 272.
46 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6

(1956).

47 This raises a whole range of issues commencing with pre-trial discovery of the
prosecutor's case (see Traynor, Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 228 (1964);
Paulsen & Kadish, The Criminal Law and Its Processes, Cases and Materials
1078-95 (1962)) through providing assistance to -the accused in addition to counsel.

"The best lawyer in the world cannot competently defend an accused person if the

lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the defense, e.g., if the defendant

cannot pay the fee of an investigator to find a pivotal missing witness or a necessary
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that, in terms of the social cost, a "perfect" system is presently feasible.
That the "petty crimes" exception, even if applicable, has no precise
boundary is not surprising. The difficulties in evolving a precise definition are deep and pervasive. In part these difficulties reflect problems
inherent in the present criminal law, which has not come to grips with
the substantive nature of crime in the twentieth century. 48 This is, in
part, due to the rise of the rehabilitative philosophy with its emphasis
on the correctional process, 49 and partly because the criminal law has
been saddled with the enforcement of a tremendous volume of policies
growing out of the industrial and technological revolutions, as well as
out of the increase in social welfare legislation. The result is that there
are "crimes and crimes," and there is lacking a single unifying concept. 50
However, in attempting to measure the limits of "petty crimes," the
"traditional" attempt to classify as "criminal" that which warranted the
moral condemnation of the society certainly has relevance here ;51 "we
cannot exclude recognition of a scale of moral values according to which
some offenses are heinous and some are not." 52 And, on this basis,
"reckless driving" which carried only a thirty-day sentence or a one
hundred dollar fine was held not to be a petty offense because it was
an act of "obvious depravity," 5 whereas the offense of unlicensed dealing in secondhand goods was characterized as "petty" even though

54
punishable by a ninety-day sentence or a three hundred dollar fine.

document, or that of an expert accountant or mining engineer or chemist." United
States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting). Accordingly, it has been suggested that the denial of the requisite funds to an indigent
is a denial of due process (Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1434, 1440 (1965)), or more
narrowly, a denial of the effective assistance of counsel. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial
Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases,
59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 289, 334-41 (1964) ; see also Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247,
257 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. granted 381 U.S. 902 (1965). The latter ground has the
advantage of not requiring the extension of its principle as a matter of constitutional
law into the civil area. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). See generally
Note, Aid in Addition to Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 47 Minn. L. Rev.
1054 (1963). The underlying assumptions of Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963), may represent a major doctrinal breakthrough and become the first
step in
requiring as a matter of constitutional law assistance to indigents in addition to
that of counsel. See Kamisar, Book Review of Gideon's Trumpet, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
478, 481, 486 (1964). Compare Kamisar, supra note 21, at 267-77.
48 Hart, supra note 30, at 431.
49 Allen, op. cit. supra note 30, at 25-41. See also Packer, Two Models of the
Criminal Process, 113 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1, 67 (1964).
50 Allen, op. cit. supra note 30, at 3-5. For recent evidences of the lack of
unifying concepts, see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963);
Comment, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 290, 311-14 (1965). See also One 1958 Plymouth
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437 (1965).
51 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-60 (1952) ; Hart, supra

note 30.
52
58
54

Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra note 41, at 981.
District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
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Moreover, the presence or absence of social condemnation (assuming
that it can be ascertained as a fact) cannot be taken as the sole standard.
Some offenses which might not involve any real social disapprobation
(e.g., some "white collar" crimes) carry with them the possibility of
significant penalties. It hardly seems possible that they could be classified
as "minor" for constitutional purposes. 55 Of course, this line of inquiry
throws open the whole question of what is a "significant" penalty. Can
an offense which carries with it the possibility of any jail sentence, however brief, be said to lack a significant penalty? Or must the jail sentence
be above a certain minimum level? It will be noted that the Court has
characterized a statute which carried a possible ninety-day jail sentence
as a "petty offense," but one wonders whether that offense would receive
55 a the Fifth Circuit
such a classification today. In Harvey v. Mississippi,
recently held Gideon applicable in striking down a guilty plea to "possession of whiskey," although the maximum punishment was five hundred
dollars and/or ninety days. 56
If an offense carrying either a significant stigma or a significant
penalty cannot fairly be characterized as a "petty offense," does this
mean in substance that Gideon has no applicability unless an offense
carries with it "the possibility of a substantial jail sentence" ?57 If an
offense provides for a fine alone, or a fine coupled with a brief jail sentence, does the minor penalty compel the conclusion that the offense is
a minor one ?58
Students and the Effective Assistance of Counsel
However generous one is with the concept of petty or minor offenses
which do not constitutionally require the "Assistance of Counsel," the
55 Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra note 41, at 981; Kamisar, supra note 21, at
270 n.212.
55a 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
56 Professors Hall and Kamisar are inclined to view Harvey as representing
an extension of the Gideon principle into the area of "petty offenses." Hall and
Kamisar, op. cit. supra note 4, at 86. This seems to me most doubtful. Under our
present standards, a ninety-day sentence seems quite substantial. But see McDonald
v. Moore, - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1965), 34 U.S.L. Week 2295.
57 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan leaves open what is a "substantial" jail sentence. Harvey, of course,
represents the view that a ninety-day sentence is "substantial"; in fact, it may
presage the applicability of Gideon to offenses carrying the possibility of any jail
sentence, however brief. See also, Evans v. Reves, 126 F.2d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir.
1942). But it hardly seems realistic to require the appointment of counsel for the
routine drunk or breach of the peace cases. McDonald v. Moore, supra note 56.
58 It may be argued that a simple fine case is unrealistic since the indigent
defendant will simply be unable to pay a fine. But imprisonment for non-payment
of fine is still common. E.g., McDonald v. Moore, - F.2d -, 34 U.S.L. Week 2295.

If constitutional under present equal protection concepts (see materials collected
in Criminal Law Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 8, pp. 52-53) this practice could reduce all
fine cases to jail sentence cases. Moreover, the state might require a convicted indigent to repay the fine in installments. And even a conviction carrying only a fine
might have significant "extralegal" consequences to the accused.
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fact is that the Roxbury defenders are involved in many cases which are
serious by any standard; they have, for example, been assigned matters
carrying potential prison sentences of up to two and one-half years. Thus,
we are squarely faced with the question whether the Roxbury soldiers
may be a part of Gideon's army.
One might insist that, as constituted, the Roxbury defender program
is manifestly constitutional. After all, Mr. Bailey, not a student, is counsel of record; and his participation is by no means merely formal. He
discusses each case with the student team in terms of its legal, evidentiary
and tactical problems; he supervises the drafting of motions and special
pleas; and he personally supervises the trial of each case, sitting with the
student counsel at the counsel table and, under a special arrangement
with the court, examining witnesses when he thinks it advisable. In one
sense, it is Mr. Bailey who is counsel, aided and abetted by a large team
of law clerks and investigators; in short, the capacities of one man have
been enlarged thirtyfold-with the "slight exception" that his law clerks
and investigators are permitted a carefully controlled participation in the
trial process itself. Such a program poses no threat to the policies which
lie at the core of the requirement of "Assistance of Counsel" ;59 indeed,
it is at least as consistent with those policies as permitting relatively
inexperienced members of the bar to represent indigents. In addition, no
substantial harm can be done at the district court level, at least where a
convicted indigent utilizes his right to appeal to the superior court for a
trial de novo.
This analysis is not quite satisfying, however. The Roxbury Project's
utilization of law students was conceived of as making a substantial contribution to the problems created by Gideon. Yet, for constitutional purposes the role of student counsel is sought to be minimized, and an
attempt is made to characterize the problem as though it involves no
more than representation of indigents by experienced counsel who is
aided by (a) student assistants, and (b) an automatic appeal to the
superior court for a trial de novo. Moreover, even if this characterization
be substantially correct, the program is of limited utility since its validity
depends on the actual presence of Mr. Bailey in the courtroom. But if
this program is to be expanded-if more than a limited number of
students are to participate-it is doubtful whether such program can be
tied to the perpetual personal attendance of experienced counsel in the
courtroom. The significant problem is, therefore, whether a program
similar to the Roxbury Project but without the inevitable courtroom
attendance of a Mr. Bailey complies with Gideon; in sum, the issue is
59 Such an analysis would seek shelter from the state court decisions which lend
no objection to representation by unlicensed practitioners who are assisted by licensed practitioners. See Annot., 68 A.L.R. 2d 1141, 1150 (1959).
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the constitutionality of rule 11 as written, since it provides that the
''expression 'general supervision' . . . shall not be construed to require
the personal attendance in court of the supervising member of the bar."
Gideon requires that in all serious criminal cases the defendant be
accorded "Assistance of Counsel." No attempt was there made to enlarge
upon the content of that requirement; and, accordingly, one must look
elsewhere to determine the measure of the obligation imposed. An argument that nothing in the constitution prohibits a state from admitting
third-year law students to its bar, either generally or for limited purposes,
does not conclude the inquiry because it is certainly possible to construe
the sixth amendment as prohibiting these students from representing
indigents "in all criminal prosecutions." Yet such an interpretation seems
to me hard to justify, and results from framing the inquiry in the wrong
terms.60 The question is not whether the accused has been represented
by a member of the bar, but whether he has had the "Assistance of
Counsel." As will be seen, membership in the bar does not conclude the
latter question; and neither should absence of such membership be
decisive. 6'
In seeking to define the content of the sixth amendment's requirement
of "Assistance of Counsel," I doubt that anything of value is to be gained
by rummaging through the writings of the colonial fathers in search of
enlightenment.6 2 Nor is anything gained by a minute analysis of the
history of lay representation in the civil or the criminal courts.8 3 Mean60 There are, however, some state court cases which assume that the right to
counsel embraces the right to be represented by a fully licensed practitioner. See
Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1959). The decisions generally lay heavy stress upon
the representation provisions of the state constitutions involved, and moreover, many
of the cases involve wholly ineffective representation by untutored laymen. These
cases do not, of course, conclude the question of the scope of the sixth amendment.
The federal precedents are scanty. See, for example, the passing dictum in Achtien
v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1941). In Re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U.S. 291
(1890), a petitioner for habeas corpus asserted, inter alia, that his representation
by an unlicensed practitioner was a violation of due process. The issue was not
decided since it was "non-jurisdictional" in nature and, at that time, habeas corpus
was available only to reach "jurisdictional" questions. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372

U.S. 391 (1963).

61 As has been observed, there are now over a half dozen states which make
some provision for representation of indigent defendants by law school students.

See note 31 supra.
62 For an example of what seems to me to be history of little moment, see Kaye,
supra note 41, at 261-68. Moreover, even if this history were more definite than it is,
it would not preclude the need for a fresh look. E.g., School District v. Schempp,

374 U.S. 203, 237-41 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ; Bickel, The Original Understanding and The Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 59 (1955).
68 It is common knowledge that during a significant part of our history there

was-and there yet remain traces of-lay representation in both civil and criminal
causes. Massachusetts still permits non-lawyers to appear in small claim proceedings. Mass. Dist. Ct. R. 12. Student counsel seem to have been involved in Baker
v. State, 130 Pac. 820 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912) ; Jones v. State, 57 Ga. App. 344,
195 S.E. 316 (1938). The scanty, inconclusive and essentially irrelevant nature of
the precedents make it clear that the issue must be examined de novo.
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ingful history begins with Powell v. Alabama,"4 which held that "Assistance of Counsel" meant "effective" assistance of counsel. Gideon, no
more than Mapp v. Ohio,65 "sounded [a] death knell for our federalism," 6 6 and it seems to me that any program bearing reasonable promise

of providing indigents with the "effective" assistance of counsel satisfies
the constitutional mandate. And I suggest that carefully constructed
student defender systems do provide indigents with effective assistance
67
of counsel, as the briefs in Gideon clearly assumed.
There is no longer any question that constitutionally "ineffective"
counsel will render a conviction void. There have, moreover, been
several exhaustive studies on the rapidly mushrooming case law concerning whether counsel has been constitutionally "ineffective." 68 However,
we need not here attempt to delineate the precise contours of that stillevolving standard. Our inquiry is a narrower one, for we assume the
standard and ask whether the performance of carefully trained and
supervised third-year students, most of whom are but a few months
away from admission to the bar, should be measured by that standard, or
whether these students should be conclusively presumed to be ineffective;
that is, does student "assistance" present so great a probability that the
students will commit the kind of errors that render the assistance of
counsel "ineffective" that their participation should be condemned in
64 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation
as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 289,
293-95 (1964), discusses Powell v. Alabama, supra, in this respect and collects
other cases.
65 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
66 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 31 (1963); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 92
(1964). In Gideon Counsel for the petitioner, the now Mr. Justice Fortas, observed: "In other words, the states will remain at liberty to experiment and to
adopt a system for the appointment of counsel consonant with community needs
and resources, subject only to the requirement that the system adopted fulfill the
constitutional imperative and guarantee effective legal aid to all persons accused
of a serious offense who do not competently and intelligently waive such assistance.
We believe that this is an instance of federalism in operation in an appropriate
form: Under our system, we submit, the demands and the benefits of federalism
should take the form of a diversity of method. Federalism properly considered does
not demand or permit a negation of basic constitutional principle." Brief for Petitioner, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In the Brief for American
Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, pp. 33-38, Brief for State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae, pp. 21-23, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), it was
recognized that there was tremendous room for experimentation.
67 Brief for Petitioner, p. 35, Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus
Curiae, p. 35 Brief for State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae, p. 35, Gideon v.
Wainright, 32 U.S. 335 (1963), assumed the validity of at least carefully constructed student programs. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that use of
student counsel for an indigent is not the kind of invidious distinction between rich
and poor in the administration of the criminal law which is condemned by Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and its progeny.
68 Waltz, supra note 64; Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent
Defendant, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1434 (1965) ; Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel,
49 Va. L. Rev. 1531 (1963).
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limine as inherently prejudicial. This latter approach seems required by
decisions such as Estes v. Texas,6 9 where the Court recognized that:
It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused.
Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State involves
such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed
inherently lacking in due process.70
On the face of the matter, representation by carefully trained thirdyear students does not render the criminal process a "farce" or a
"mockery of justice," the generally verbalized standard for determining
whether counsel has been constitutionally ineffective ;71 or, as I think the
standard should be framed, student representation does not make it
unlikely that a fair trial could be had in accordance with the applicable
72
constitutional principles.
More specifically, one cannot presume that carefully trained students
are appreciably more likely, at any stage, than members of the bar to
commit those errors which have rendered counsel constitutionally "ineffective." First. At the pre-trial stage, counsel must concern himself
with the applicable substantive and procedural law, and make an adequate
investigation of his client's case. In these respects, I suggest, the indigent
may be better off with student counsel. We are all familiar with the too
common practice of many lawyers hastily preparing the cases of their less
affluent clients on the courthouse steps. The students, bustling with
enthusiasm, have taken this part of their task very seriously, as all those
who have had any contact with the Roxbury Project will attest.
Second. At the trial itself the law school student is in a position
essentially no different from the relatively young member of the bar,
except that he has had more careful supervision and ideally will have had
at least his first trial supervised by a "Mr. Bailey." Unless we condemn
out of hand criminal defense by young lawyers, I fail to see that student
lawyers are to be presumed ineffective here. Perhaps in an ideal system
only experienced lawyers should represent criminal defendants. But,
69 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
70 Id. at 542.

States, 318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963).
72 An articulation which requires only that a "fair trial" be had seems too narrow.
Some of the constitutional rules developed in the criminal area (for example, the
rule requiring the exclusion of evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search
71 See, e.g., Rivera v. United

and seizure) have little to do with the reliability of the guilt-determining process;

they are, instead, designed to deter illegal police conduct. Linkletter v. Walker, 381

U.S. 618 (1965). Since the evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search is not
"inherently unreliable," it is clear one could receive a "fair trial" even though
counsel did not attempt to exclude such evidence, but counsel is still held to be
"ineffective" if this ground for exclusion was evident. See People v. Ibarra, 60
Cal. 2d 460 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487 (1963). See also Cobb v. Balkcom,
339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1964).
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plainly, we are far from that millennium; our society simply cannot afford
to read the sixth amendment, or any other constitutional provision, as
mandating "the assistance of experienced counsel." Moreover, such a
view wrongly equates experience with competence and, more importantly,
inexperience with incompetence. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising
that "no court has gone so far as to hold erroneous the appointment of a
fledgling lawyer in the absence of demonstrated prejudice to the accused
attributable to his counsel's inexperience." 73
I am not, however, prepared to push logic to its breaking point. While
I think that given the interests at stake every criminal trial does not
require the appointment of a Clarence Darrow for the defense, and that
third-year students do not give the lie to the constitutional promise of a
fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, I am nonetheless troubled by
inexperienced trial lawyers (and, therefore, students) being assigned to
cases carrying heavy penalties. I am not, after all, suggesting that we
should assume that all lawyers are fungible, that youthful vigor is a complete substitute for experience. While we desire methods designed to insure reasonable reliability in the guilt-determining process, I suggest
that it is consistent with our constitutional notions of due process and
effective assistance of counsel to permit the inexperienced advocate to
plead causes, subject to a showing of prejudice rendering his representation "ineffective." But where the stakes are higher, where the penalties
which can be imposed are more severe, perhaps we can now afford the
luxury of demanding an additional safeguard-the presence of experi74
enced counsel at the very outset.
Third. The threat of post-trial ineffectiveness does not seem to me
to be greatly increased by use of student counsel. The student, like the
experienced lawyer, must consider whether to move for a new trial
and/or to advise an appeal (in the Roxbury Project a trial de novo). The
danger of "ineffective" action here is not appreciably increased, unless
it is thought that the "practical" judgment of experienced trial counsel is
of constitutional dimension. In the Roxbury Project Mr. Bailey plays a
determinative role in the advice given to the client at this stage, and
presumably so would his counterpart in other programs.
IV
Carefully constructed programs for student representation of indigents seem to me to pose no threat to the policies embodied in the sixth
78 Waltz, supra note 64, at 307. See MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 604 (5th
Cir. 1960), which indicates that the trial judge must assume an active role in
"protecting the defendant . .. from the obvious errors of inexperienced appointed
counsel."
74 The essential relationship between this topic and the consideration lying at
the heart of the "petty crime-serious crime" distinction is obvious.
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amendment. Quite to the contrary, they give real meaning to the amendment's salutary aims. I should, perhaps, end on this positive note, but it
seems to me appropriate to comment briefly, if negatively, on two additional aspects of the Roxbury Project which have been suggested in
support of its constitutionality.
First, it is argued that the indigent himself consents 75 to student
representation and thus he waives any right he might have to "more
effective" counsel. This is hardly tenable. If an indigent is entitled to
have the assistance of "more effective" counsel, his consent to student
representation is not a "waiver" of that right, under the rigorous conception of waiver operable in this area.70 The waiver form carefully refrains from indicating that the indigent has a different choice available,
and the harried, troubled defendant cannot be compelled to read between
the lines. Accordingly, I conclude that any argument based on the defendant's "consent" is a makeweight. 77
Secondly, under the Massachusetts practice a defendant who is convicted in the district court is entitled to appeal to the superior court for a
trial de novo. 78 Thus, it is said, even assuming the worst, a convicted
defendant has not been materially prejudiced because he is entitled to a
trial de novo. Accordingly, for constitutional purposes, student counsel
in Roxbury at most presents a case of harmless error. This line of reasoning has, in another context, apparently commended itself to the Supreme
75 The form of consent is as follows:

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Suffolk, ss.

-

No.

Court

COMMONWEALTH
V.
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF STUDENT-COUNSEL
I,
, have been informed of my right, pursuant to General Rule
10 of the Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court, to have counsel appointed by the
court to represent me at every stage of the proceedings in this case. I have been
advised that I may at my election be represented by a Senior Student in an
accredited law school in the Commonwealth under the supervision of a member of
the bar of the Commonwealth assigned by a court or employed by a recognized legal
aid society or voluntary defender committee to represent an indigent defendant in
a criminal case as a matter of charity. I elect to be represented by a Student designated by the court and request said appointment by the court.
Signed:
,19Signature of Defendant
76 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439-40 (1963) ; Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th

Cir. 1964) ; Williams v. Alabama, 341 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1964).
77 In evaluating waiver arguments, it is well to bear in mind the "lesson of
history that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights." Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
78 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 278, § 18 (1955).
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Judicial Court. 79 Moreover, it draws some support from those cases
which, despite Hamilton v. Alabama,8 0 refuse to conclude that there is
an absolute right to counsel at arraignment absent a showing of prejudice, and the Supreme Court's recent dicta in Pointer v. Texas81 keeps
the arraignment question open. The argument would be that the arraignment cases show that an accused may not complain of the absence of
counsel unless his legal rights have been impaired, and even following
his conviction in the Roxbury District Court, a defendant has all of his
defenses available to him de novo in the superior court. In fact, he has
had the benefit of ascertaining the prosecution's case, a sort of pre-trial
discovery.
While it is true that an appeal to the superior court opens the whole
case anew, the Supreme Judicial Court has not considered whether an
appeal renders the proceedings in district court are a total nullity. For
example, if the defendant had taken the stand in the district court trial,
has he "waived" any right to refuse to do so in the superior court? Can
testimony given by the defendant in the district court be used to impeach
him in the superior court? And in any event, the defendant's counsel
may have made tactical errors in the district court which exposed weaknesses in the defendant's case, which, in turn, the prosecutor may seize
upon in the superior court. In sum, it is doubtful that the proceedings in
the district court can realistically be viewed as never having occurred,
although in some cases the defendant might be hard put to prove actual
prejudice. 82
79 Commonwealth v. O'Leary, 347 Mass. 387, 198 N.E.2d 403 (1964). However,
in O'Leary, the defendant was not on trial for a misdemeanor or a lesser felony
over which the district court had trial jurisdiction. Rather, he appeared before the
court on a probable cause hearing and pleaded not guilty. The district court found
probable cause, and the defendant was bound over for the grand jury. Following his

conviction, he argued to the Supreme Judicial Court that he should be discharged

since counsel was not provided to him at the probable cause hearing. The contention
was rejected, the court saying in part that: "As matters transpired, the defendant

was no worse off in the District Court than if he had had counsel. There is no
intimation that counsel would have done something that the defendant did not do
or that he would have refrained from doing something which the defendant did do.
The course the defendant pursued was intelligent and one which might be reasonably
expected even where a defendant was represented by counsel. He did not plead
guilty and so was not prejudiced in any of the respects his brief outlines as would
have befallen in that event. He was not held upon oppressive bail, as his brief
suggests might have been possible. Nothing was waived. The defendant was not

barred from raising any defence whatsoever. An unimpaired opportunity still
remains to move to suppress evidence should there be any need to do so, a fact as
to which we are uninformed. In short, no right of the slightest value has been lost."
Id. at 389, 198 N.E.2d at 405. Perhaps the court would limit O'Leary to non-trial
proceedings in the district court, although the language of the opinion suggests no

such limitation.
80 368 U.S. 52 (1961). Cf. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). See generally
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, II Defender Newsletter, No. 4, July
6, 1965.
81 380 U.S. 400, 402 (1965). See also United States v. Fay, 350 F.2d 214 (2d
Cir. 1965).
82 Most courts, however, seem disposed to consider the question in terms of a
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Moreover, it is not at all apparent that a defendant entitled to "effective" counsel should be first required to submit to the ordeal of a trial with
"ineffective" counsel. In Callan v. Wilson,"3 for example, the defendant
was convicted without a jury for the petty offense of "conspiracy" and
sentenced to pay a twenty-five dollar fine or serve thirty days. The statute
provided that a convicted defendant could appeal for a trial de novo. The
Supreme Court held that conspiracy was not a petty offense and that a
procedure which refused defendant a jury trial until appeal after a conviction violated the sixth amendment. The Court said that the jury trial
guarantee "secures to [the defendant] the right to enjoy that mode of
trial from the first moment, and in whatever court he is put on trial for
the offence charged.18 4 The relevance of this decision received additional
5
support from cases like Escobedo v. IllinoisH
which fix the accused's
rights of counsel at a time well in advance of any formal judicial proceedings. Once the right to counsel attaches, it seems hardly plausible that a
state can provide "ineffective" counsel until there has been a showing of
"actual" prejudice.8 6 I conclude, therefore, that neither "waiver" nor the
trial de novo argument adds anything to the constitutionality of student
representation programs. Their constitutionality cannot rest on such
frail supports.
V
There has been considerable agitation from every angle to reawaken
interest in the criminal law, and it has been rightly observed that the
law schools must shoulder a major burden in this hoped-for renaissance.
There is no doubt that there has been a general quickening of interest in
the law schools ;87 and the Roxbury Project is but one facet of this
process. That such a program has advantages in terms of stimulating
student interest in the whole area of criminal law and its administration
is readily apparent. And, I submit, it provides an acceptable corps for
"Gideon's Army."
showing of prejudice. If the "effectiveness of the legal assistance ultimately furnished an accused is likely to be prejudiced by its prior denial, the earlier period

may be deemed a critical stage in the judicial process." DeToro v. Peppersack, 332
F.2d 341, 343-44 (4th Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Fay, supra note 81, at 215. In
view of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), "prejudice" seems not capable
of being limited to "legal prejudice," that is, a loss of ascertainable legal rights,
but to include tactical and evidentiary losses as well.
88 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
84 Id. at 557. This would not be true in respect to "petty offenses." Doub and
Kestenbaum, Federal Magistrates for the Trial of Petty Offenses: Need and Constitutionality, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 443, 466 (1959).
85 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
As has been pointed out, supra note 19, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335

86

(1963), discards the notion that generally the absence of counsel does not result in
prejudice to the accused.
87 Symposium, 43 Texas L. Rev. 271 (1965).

